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THE GUARANTEE OF ORDER AND

REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT IN THE STATES.

SHORT time ago, the whole country was plunged into a condi-

tion of anxiety and excitement by- the conﬂicting claims tothe

executive authority in one of the States, and by the preparations

made, and measures set on foot, to support them. With nothing pre-

ceding it to prepare the public for such an event, the announcement

came by telegraph that a judgment had been entered up in one of

the inferior courts of the State, declaring the person who for a year

and more had acted as Governor, under claim of election and with

full recognition of his lawful right by the other departments of gov-

ernment, had never been elected in fact, but was a usurper and must

be ousted, and the person who was his opponent in the election

installed in the office. The circumstances attending the decision all

indicated that it was not made in the expectation that the usual

deference which judicial decisions are entitled to andare expected to

receive, would be paid to it, but that it was well understood to be

extraordinary, and was intended as the first step in an organized

and forcible revolution in the State government. Secret prepara-'

tions for such a revolution had already been made, and there was

immediate attempt to render them effectual by seizing the public

olﬁces and public records, and placing armed men in possession of the
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State House. The resistance of ‘the acting governor brought hostile

military forces face to face at the State Capitol, and for four weeks

and more, preparations for.a conﬂict of force were carried on through-

out the State, with all the evidences of a purpose to submit to- the

arbitrament of war a question which, under the American system of

government, is supposed to depend exclusively upon a counting of

ballots. While thus the hostile parties stood in threatening attitude,

the eyes of the whole country, as by common consent, were turned

to a single person at Washington, who was supposed to possess the

power, not only to prevent a hostile collision but also to put an end

to the whole controversy by his declaration of an intention to sup-

0
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port one of the two parties to the dispute. The organs of public

sentiment appealed to the President to interpose, and the public,

who were scandalized by the whole proceeding, which they justly

regarded as a reproach to American institutions, awaited his action

with anxiety and impatience. Even the rival claimants sent appeals

to Washington, and at last appeared there by counsel, each seeking

to convince the President of the justice of his claims, but each at

the same time assuming that whatever decision should be made must

necessarily determine the controversy. The President gave his

decision at last, and the party against whom it was made at once

disbanded his forces, and relinquished his attempt upon the office;

the more prominent ofﬁcials who took sides with him, resigned or

were removed; some were even arrested for treason, but in a few

days quiet was restored, and the evidences of disturbance had passed

away.

And this determination of a threatening and dangerous conﬂict,

which involved the whole political authority of a State, was effected

by a word from an ofﬁcer at a distance; an ofﬁcer too, not occupying

any position in the State government, not vested with judicial author-

ity to receive evidence and determine questions of fact, and who,

though by law he had no voice whatever, as elector or otherwise, in
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making the choice for governor of the State in question, was never-

theless enabled by the force of circumstances and by the moral

power of his position in the Federal Government, to settle for the

people of the State what person should have the administration of

their affairs as chief executive.

Perhaps the main signiﬁcance of this transaction consists in the

fact that the interference of the President was generally recognized

as both necessary and legitimate, and that wherever his action was

criticised by persons not involved in the contest, it was not because

he brought the power of his position as federal executive to the

determination of a dispute pertaining exclusively to the administra-

tion of State government, but because he was so tardy in interfering,

and left the dispute open so long. There was no claim that he had

usurped any authority or violated any law. The inference seems

irresistible that in the opinion of the public it is legitimate for the

President under some circumstances to take conclusive action in the

settlement of questions of State government, and to determine by

his ﬁat who shall and who shall not administer its affairs. If this

occurrence stood alone, it would be less signiﬁcant; butI within a

brief period it was preceded by several others, in which the authority '
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of the government at Washington, or of some one or more of its.

departments, was employed in giving direction to, and in some cases

in controlling, the internal affairs of States. The present would

therefore seem to be a ﬁtting occasion for some examination of these

occurrences, in order that we may see how far they are justiﬁed by

the rules of law, and by the principles upon which our government

has been organized.

It will not be disputed by any one that the States, when they

assented to the Federal Constitution, contemplated interference in

their internal affairs only in extraordinary emergencies which were

particularly speciﬁed. All propositions to give to the General Govern-

ment, or to any one of its departments, a negative upon State laws,

were received with little favor in the constitutional convention, and

the suggestion that the governors of the States should be appointed

by the federal executive with still less. The prevailing opinion was
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—perhaps we may say the general opinion—that Federal and State

governments ought respectively to. be sovereign within their allotted

spheres of constitutional action, and that one of the chief purposes

to be kept in view in forming a constitution, should be to ﬁx and

deﬁne the limits of their respective powers, and to establish securities

against conﬂict and confusion in their exercise. It may safely be

assumed that such a thing as the setting up or putting down of a

State government, or the putting in or out of a State executive, by the

mandate or authority of the President or of Congress, was never con-

templated as among possible events under the Constitution which

the convention agreed upon and the States ratiﬁed. Still less did it

* "occur to any one that the time might ever come when, in consequence

of extraordinary events, the General Congress would deem itself

impelled to assert and exercise the right to a supervision of State

. constitutions and laws, so long as they were of the general character

of those which with public approbation were originally adopted, or

that it might compel their amendment in order to bring them more

completely into harmony with the sentiments of the Congress itself.

The possibility, however, that Federal interferencein State affairs

might under some circumstances become a necessity to the Union, was

not only foreseen, but the propriety of making provision for it was

generally conceded. The Union of the States was founded upon unity

of race and language, and similarity of institutions, and upon the

necessity of combined strength and resources, in order that the insti-

tutions might be_ preserved and perpetuated. But the similarity of_

institutions might at any time be destroyed by a revolution in govern-
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ment in one or more of the States, accomplished either by the force

and violence of a faction, or as the peaceful result ofa change in the

political sentiments of the people : and however improbable such an

event might have been thought, the experience of the world did not

justify the convention in assuming that it ought not to be considered

among the possibilities against which prudence would demand secur

ities. VVhether such a revolution should be effected by the action

of the majority of the people proceeding under the forms of an election,

or by a forcible displacement of the existing government, would not be

so material as the fact, that by means of it incongruous institutions

would be brought into the Union with an inevitable tendency to its

disruption. It was consequently in the exercise of wise statesman-

ship in providing securities for the Union that the convention made

provision in the Constitution that

“ The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican

form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion, and on appli-

cation of the legislature, or of the executive when the legislature can not be convened,

against domestic violence."

It is interesting after this lapse of time to considerhow little the

framers of the Constitution, and the very able and astute statesmen

who by their writings and speeches commended it to the favor of the

people, anticipated the importance which future events might give to
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some of its provisions, or the practical construction that, in their

application to subsequent occurrences, might be put upon them. VVe

have no evidence, for instance, that any one at that time anticipated

that the provision agreed upon to preclude the repudiation of debts

could contain within itself such obstacles to State legislation in various

directions as have since been discovered ; or that the requirement of a

guarantee of republican government might one day be relied upon by

able and ‘earnest statesmen, as the authority under which govern-

ments whose features were unquestionably republican, and some of

which had existed with little change from the time the Constitution

was formed, might be put aside as not being republican in fact. The

provisionprecluding the States from passing any laws violating the

obligation of contracts was passed over with a bare mention by the

writers of the “ Federalist," and the guarantee ofrepublican government

received little more notice in their discussions. The provision extends,

says Mr. Madison in No. 43,

“ No farther than to a guarantee of a republican form of government, which sup-

poses a pre-existing form of government of the fomi which is to be guaranteed. As
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long, therefore, as the existing republican forms are continued by the States, they

are guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. Whenever the States may choose to

substitute other republican forms they have a right to do so, and to claim the

Federal guarantee for the latter. The only restriction imposed on them is, that

they shall not change republican for anti-republican constitutions; a restriction

which, it is presumed, will hardly be considered a grievance.”

And the few remarks he adds to prove how idle would be any fear

that such a requirement could ever be dangerous to the'States, or

be made the pretext for unconstitutional interference, we have no

reason to doubt 'were satisfactory to the general public of that day.

The controversial papers of the time certainly disclose no evidences

to the contrary.

“ A republican form of government,” however, is not capable of

being made by the deﬁnition to stand so clearly and distinctly apart

from all others as to preclude the possibility of cavil concerning the

authority and obligation of the Federal government to guarantee to a

State any particular government which may have been set up or been

proposed. The differences in those which have been known in history

have been very great, not only in form, but also in the rights and pri- '

vileges they secured to the people, and those which, for the purposes

of government, they required the people to surrender. And in the

case of a mixed government, in which the power of the crown has
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become nominal, and the sovereignty is exercised by representatives

of the people as it now is in Great Britain, the term republican is not

inaptly or unjustly applied. Such mixed governments, however, we

may safely assume, are excluded by a proper interpretation of the con-

stitutional provision. No doubt can exist that the people of the

United States, to whom the name of king was then specially obrfoxious,

adopted the constitution with the understanding that no government

with a hereditary executive could be received or could remain within

the family of States. The king, to their apprehension, was the

representative of the oppressor whose yoke they had rejected, and by

a republic they understood a government in which a king would have

no part, and the chief ruler would be chosen directly or indirectly by

the people by virtue of their inherent right to govern themselves.

And the phrase they employed—a republican form of government--

has peculiar signiﬁcance, and may well incline us to believe that the

form was had in view quite as much as the substance. The guarantee

was clearly intended, as Mr. Madison understood it, to be of the gov-

ernments then existing, and of such similar ones as might by Con-
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gress be received into the Union subsequently, modiﬁed as they

might be from time to time by the people of the States respectively.*

T/ze'people./ There is no word which plays a larger part in the

catch phrases of politics, and none which is employed in a sense more

vague and indeﬁnite. We all believe in the right of the people to

rule. As Mr. Choate has said, “It is certain that in the American

theory, the free theory of government, it is the right of the people at

any moment of its representation in the State legislature to make all

laws, and by its representatives in convention, to make the Constitu-

tion anew. It is their right to do so peaceably, and according to

existing forms, and by revolution against all forms." But while one

“people " would act under the forms, it would be almost certain to

be another “ people " who would act against the forms. It is never

all the citizens, or even the major portion of them, who participate in

establishing and maintaining representative government. Under the

most liberal constitution ever made, a comparatively small number,

perhaps one-fourth of all, are permitted a voice in the government,

and act by representatives in the making of laws. If we examine

the constitutions existing when the Federal Government was orga-

nized, we ﬁnd under some the proportion was much smaller, and we

discover restrictions upon suffrage, such as the popular voice at the

present day would unhesitatingly pronounce unreasonable and unjust.
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But the Federal Constitution was not supposed capable of correcting

all injustice and inequality in the States; it was not framed with a

purpose or looking to a mission so comprehensive; it must take cog-

nizance of things as they were, and doing so it must recognize those

found in possession of political privileges and wielding the political

authority of a State under its constitution as in the aggregate making

up the political corporate entity, I/ze State, and known to constitu-

_tional law as THE PEOPLE. And whatever the abstract theory of right

to proceed “by revolution against all forms," the Federal Constitu-

tion contemplates no revolution in State governments. It may be

assumed to have contemplated changes in constitution and laws, in

accordance with constitutional forms, but it supposed these would

prove ample to meet the reasonable demands of reform, and it

_ * Mr. John Adams and Mr. ]'eﬂ'erson have both remarked upon the vagueness of the

word repuélir. “As it is used," says the former, “it may signify any thing, every thing, or

nothing." " The government of Great Britain, and that of Poland, are as strictly republics

as that of Rhode Island or Connecticut, under their old charters." Works, vol. x., p. 378.

Compare the views of Jefferson, Works, vi., 605. Probably the two would not have disagreed

as to the sense in which the term republican government in the Constitution was to be

understood.
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‘govern the whole.

endeavored to make most effectual provision against changes which

might be attempted outside those forms, and by the employment of

force. 771:‘ people who were excluded from participation in State

governmentwere expected to ﬁnd at the hands of those who wielded

the political authority, the proper attention to all just complaints.

How far such an expectation would be justiﬁed by the event, was

to be determined in the case of Rhode Island. The facts of that

case are so well understood that only very brief reference need be

made to them here. For more than half a century after the Federal

Constitution was established, the people had neglected to form a

State constitution, and the government had been administered under

the colonial charter granted by Charles II. In other words, that

charter had been accepted as a suﬂicient and satisfactory constitution,

and it might perhaps have continued to be such until the present

day, but for an unequal apportionment of representatives, and for

its restrictions upon suffrage, which conﬁned the privilege to less

than one half the adult white male resident citizens. Attempts to

substitute a more liberal and just constitution failed to receive the

approval of the legislature. and the dissatisﬁed classes at last appeal-

ing to that ﬁrst and highest of the fundamental principles of our

democratic republican governments, that the people are sovereign,
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summoned a convention of representatives of the people for the

exercise of this sovereignty, and by this convention a constitution

was framed and submitted to a popular vote for adoption.

This constitution, however, like the old charter, allowed only

certain classes of citizens a voice in the government. Moreover,

these classes were selected by arbitrary standards which did not

necessarily determine their ﬁtness for the elective franchise, and

might perhaps exclude others of equal or greater ﬁtnessl Voters

must be males, they must have reached a certain age, and they must

have certain qualiﬁcations of birth or naturalization and residence-.

Persons possessing these qualiﬁcations were not_only to take the

reins of authority into their hands for their own government, but

as the proper representatives of the whole society, they were to

This was what was proposed, and this was what

was attempted to be carried out by means of an election of State

oﬂicers after the proposed constitution had been voted upon and

declared adopted.

The case then was this: One class of persons, selected by certain

arbitrary standards under the charter, possessed and were exercising

the powers of government, and another class selected by other arbi-

.c\n
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trary standards proposed to take possession of them. As the ﬁrst

class had possessed these powers for many years, under a charter of

government which had been acquiesced in by all others, and under

which they had preserved order and exercised the highest rights of

State sovereignty, they had at least this acquiescence asevidence of

their right, and would be justly entitled to rely upon it until better

evidence should be adduced of the right of others. The better evi-

dence of the right of the revolutionary party could only be this: that

their constitution was more liberal and just in the matter of repre-

sentation and suffrage. If there were principles of natural right

which were generally accepted, and to which obedience would conse-

quently be 'rendered as of course, by means of which the difﬁcult

questions of suffrage might be judged and determined, the preten-

sions which were put fonvard in the Rhode Island case ought to have

been tested by them. But it is only in the vague talk of theorists

and demagogues that we ﬁnd any such principles asserted. If nature

determines any thing on the subject, it is only that, from physical and

mental immaturity and imperfections, it is impossible that certain

classes should take part in the affairs of state. Beyond that it does not

go ; and between those who may and those who may not have a voice in

the government, the line of distinction must be determined by human

reason, acting in the light of experience, and prescribing a rule by posi-
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tive law. And the positive law once prescribed must be respected and

obeyed until it is set aside by the authority that prescribed it, or there

can be no settled government. Ifthe mere circumstance that the old

constitution is less liberal than the new, subjects the former to be set

aside of right, then it is manifest that no constitution can be of binding

obligation, so long as a more liberal one is possible, but any that

shall be established may be overturned at the option of dissatisﬁed

classes who shall see ﬁt to frame a new one with a broader basis of

suffrage, and assert their right to put it in force. The constitution

of to-day, under which adult males only may vote, would be over-

thrown the moment women should demand the ballot, and the con-

stitution of their framing in turn must give way to any broader

charter of government which should reduce the requirement of age,

or dispense with that of naturalization or residence. To recognize

such a doctrine would be to enact anarchy as a constitutional prin-

ciple. And it is worthy of note, that the very case which was

presented in Rhode Island, was one which had been anticipated by

Mr. Madison, as likely to happen, and in which it might become the

duty of the United States to interfere in support of the State gov-
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ernment against domestic violence. “ May it not happen," he says

in the “ Federalist," “ that the minority of c¢'tz'zens [electors] may be-

come a majority of persons by the accession of alien residents, of a

casual concourse of adventurers, or of l/£05! w/zom Z/ze constilution of

the State has not admitted 10 1/16’ rzlq/It of .ruﬁ"rage? " It was under

precisely these circumstances that the President was -called upon‘ to

sustain in Rhode Island the authorities under the charter constitu-

tion—a constitution which, whatever it might have been three quar-

ters of acentury before, had now, as regards some of its chief fea-

tures, ceased to be just or reasonable, and perhaps also had ceased to

be one under which the government could be longer administered to

the general content of the people.

It is unnecessary to recall the details of this controversy; it is

sufﬁcient to say that there were soon two sets of persons claiming to

be the legal officers of the State, and proposing to make good their

claims, if need be, by force of arms. The probability of domestic

violence was imminent, and the duty of the United States to aid in

suppressing it, on the proper demand being made, was clear. But no

intervention by the United States could take place without a recog-

nition of one of the opposing parties as the representative of lawful

authority. It was only at unlawful violence that the provision in the

Constitution was directed, and that violence could not be unlawful
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which should consist solely in the support of the duly constituted

government against parties who proposed to subvert it. Moreover,

by the terms of the Federal Constitution, there must be a demand for

assistance from the State legislature or executive, before it could be

rendered, and to respond to a demand was to recognize the body or

the person making it as being in possession of the lawful authority.

To the popular apprehension, therefore, the duty of the President to

interpose in the suppression of domestic violence would seem to be

complicated by the necessity of ﬁrst determining such legal and con-

stitutional questions as the right to the possession of lawful State

authority might depend upon; and as whatever conclusion he might

reach would be carried out with military force, the question might

well be made whether it had been intended by the Constitution to

clothe the President with a power in its consequences so essentially

judicial, with respect to ‘legal and constitutional questions of the

gravest import, involving the highest rights of citizens, possibly the

very existence of State goyernment; and also with the authority to

execute his own judgments in a manner and with a force which could

leave to an aggrieved party no opportunity for redress. In a gov-

VOL. n.—5
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ernment by the people, with constitutional checks and balances, may

one man have such power? Would not this be a despotism?

The answer made by the President to these questions was so

unmistakably correct that only the-most violent partisanship ever

ventured to dispute his conclusions. The President found the charter

government in possession of authority which for over half a century

it had exercised under the Federal Constitution, with full recognition

and acquiescence on the part of the Federal authorities and of the

people of the State. Whatever might be his individual views of this

charter government—of its justice, of its acceptability to the majority

of the people governed by it, of its correspondence to the advanced

ideas of republican institutions which then prevailed—~he had as Pres-

ident only the right and duty to recognize the existing facts. Ques-

tions of theoretical right whizh might lie back of these, were not

for him to determine ; what he must recognize and act upon were the

attempt by dissatisﬁed parties to set aside by force the constituted

authorities, and the demand by those authorities for his assistance.

These made a‘clear case for his action under the Constitution, and

left him no discretion. Any despotic authority in the premises was

not that of the President, but of the Constitution, and had been

agreed upon for precisely such emergencies. He must obey its com-

mand, or he wouldbecome a public criminal, subject to impeachment
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and to removal from his high office. The theory of the Federal Con-

stitution was that grievances under those _of the States must be sub-

mitted to until they could be changed in accordance with established

forms. Attempts to change in other modes would be attempts at

revolution, and these were to be suppressed by force. The President,

in his message to the House of Representatives, under date of April

9, 1844, pointed out very clearly the danger, and indeed the incon-

sistency with settled government, of any other course.

"I 1nust be permitted," said he, " to disclaim entirely and unqualiﬁedly the right

on the part of the executive to make any real or supposed defects existing in any

State constitution or form of government, the pretext for a failure to enforce the

laws or the guarantees of the Constitution of the United States in reference to such

State. I utterly repudiate the idea, in terms as emphatic as I can employ, that these

laws are not to be enforced, or those guarantees complied with, because the President

may believe that the right of suffrage, or any other great popular right, is either too

restricted or too broadly enlarged. I also with equal strength resist the idea that it

falls within the executive competency to decide, in controversies of the nature of that

which existed in Rhode Island, on which side is the majority of the people, or as to

the extent of the rights of a mere numerical majority. For the executive to assume

such a power, would be to assume a power of the most dangerous character. Under
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such assumptions, the States of this Union would have no security for peace or tran-

quillity, but might be'converted into mere instruments of executive will. Actuated by

selﬁsh purposes he might become the great agitator, fomenting assaults upon the

State constitutions, and declaring the majority of to—day to be the minority of to-

morrow, and the minority in its turn, the majority before whose decrees the estab-

lished order in the State should be subverted. Revolution, civil commotion, and

bloodshed, would be inevitable consequences. The provision in the Constitution

intended for the security of the States would thus be turned into the instrument of

their destruction. The President would become in fact the real constitution maker

for the States, and all power would be vested in his hands."

What the President so forcibly said of his own want of authority

to correct real or imaginary evils in State government, is equally true

of Congress, and we may assume that his remarks were limited to his

own office because-in the particular case only his own action had been

' invoked. A practical construction was thus given to the Federal-

powers, which was not only manifestly in harmony with the purpose

of the Constitution, but which rendered them entirely safe, and pre-

cluded their being n?ade the pretext for encroachments upon State

authority. Moreover, this construction was accepted by the people

as correct. The party of that day which was in sympathy with the

new movement'in Rhode Island, though displeased at the result,

showed little disposition to take issue with the President’s conclusions.
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\'Vhen distinctly confronted with the proposition to adrhit Federal

interference in the formation or establishment of State constitutions

or laws, the traditions of the Democratic party would be too power-

ful to permit it to take centralizing ground for any mere temporary

purpose.

The fact that the President of his own authority gave or profn- _

ised the assistance called for in this instance, renders it proper to

notice that the section of the Federal Constitution under discussion

differs in its phraseology from other sections which confer power and

impose duties on the General Government. Elsewhere it is provided

what Congress may do, or to what the judicial power shall extend, or

what shall be the scope of authority and duty of the President.

But the obligation to guarantee a republican form of government to

the States, and to protect them against invasion and domestic vio-

lence, is one imposed upon “the United States.” The implication

is that the duty was not to depend for its fulﬁllment on the legisla-

tive department exclusively, but that all departments of the gov-

ernment, or at least more than one, were or might be charged with

some duty in this regard. It will be seen hereafter that it has been

Congress which hitherto has assumed to act upon the guarantee,
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while application for protection against domestic violence has, on

the other hand, been made to the President. The difference may be

attributed to the fact, that to enforce the guarantee, legislation would

generally be requisite, while protection against domestic violence

would involve only the employment of a military force, which the

President would always have at his command. From the nature of

the case, the judiciary can have little or nothing to do with questions

arising under this provision of the Constitution. What constitutes

a republican government, and what under any given circumstances it

may be found necessary to do in order to protect it, must in their

nature be political questions, and require determination by the polit-

ical departments of the government. When such questions are-thus

determined, the judiciary must accept and conform to the decision;

-or, as Sir Matthew Hale pointed out in the time of the Common-

wealth, the state would be reduced to anarchy. The Federal Supreme

Court has invariably disclaimed all right to review or question the

decisions of the political departments of the government on political

subjects. Questions regarding the force or extent of a treaty; the

rightful government to be recognized and treated with; the extent

of the territorial limits of the country; whether’ at a particular

period of time a State government had superseded the territorial:

these and all other questions properly falling within the same cate-
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gory are addressed first of all to the treaty-making or law-making

authority, whose decisions conclude all others. Mr. justice VVood-

bury pointed out with remarkable clearness, in his opinion in the case

of Luther 2/ersus Borden, arising out of the Rhode Island ‘contro-

versy, how unsuited was the judiciary to the consideration of such

subjects, and how dangerous it might prove to the liberties of the

people if a tribunal composed of persons selected for other purposes,

and whose decisions are expected to be uniform and can not conform

to the varying demands of circumstances and of public policy, were

to be clothed with the power tov decide them. It is fresh in our recol-

lections that all attempts to bring the validity of the reconstruction

laws to a judicial test were unavailing; Congress interposing very

effectual obstacles in some cases, and the Supreme Court, when direct

application was made to enjoin the President and his subordinates

from putting them in force, refusing to consider them on the merits,

on the express ground that they involved “rights of sovereignty, of

political jurisdiction, of government, of corporate existence of States

with all their constitutional powers and privileges," and that these
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did not belong to the jurisdiction of courts.* The correction of

wrongs, mistakes, abuses, or even usurpations of which in such mat-

ters the legislature may be guilty, is not conﬁded to the courts.

Perhaps we should speak more in accord with the proper theory of

constitutional government, if we were to say that the courts are not

at liberty to impute wrongs, mistakes, abuses, or usurpations to the

legislature, when acting upon questions purely political. '

,Having seen what was settled in the case of Rhode Island, we may

now pass to subsequent cases in which the guarantee of the Constitu-

tion has been appealed to or relied upon. These caseshave not been

numerous, and in some of them it is not easy to determine how far

the Federal authorities regarded themselves as acting under the com-

mand of the Constitution, or, on the other hand, obeying a great law

of necessity in an emergency for which no provision had been made.

This was particularly the case at the close of the great rebellion. The

proper method of reconstruction of the seceded States was then a

most momentous tﬁoblem to the statesmen of the cquntry, and the

most diverse and irreconcilable views were entertained, not only in

the opposing parties, but also among the leading minds in the domi-

nant party. It was a problem on which, when it came to be solved,

the President separated from his party, and the representatives of

that party in Congress proceeded in their legislation with such uncer-
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tain steps that much of their action it was deemed prudent to do over

again; and gover'nments were recognized and afterwards set aside

with more regard to a supposed necessity than to consistency of

action. The view of Mr. Sumner was, that so far as the rebel States

were concerned, no government should be recognized as republican

in form which tolerated slavery, or which excluded persons from the

' privilege of suffrage by reason of race or color. That this view pre-

vailed in Congress is not to be aﬂirmed; that it had more or less

influence is undoubtedly true; but it would seem equally clear that

while the majority in Congress kept a distinct and deﬁnite object in

_ view, they did not inquire very closely into the legal justiﬁcation for

the measures resorted to. The times were extraordinary, and in their

opinion the future peace and welfare of the country required that the

seceded States should be excluded from the full privilege of the Union

until the abolition of slavery was accepted. Even then the excep-

tional control of Congress over them as States was not removed

until impartial suffrage was assured. Whoever followed the pro-

* Georgia verrm Stanton, 6 Wallace's Reports, 77. Cases recognizing the same general

principles are referred to in the arguments of counsel and the opinion in this case.
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ceedings and debates of Congress during the period of reconstruction

could not fail to observe that much of the mention of republican

government, in the complaints against the Southern States, had no

reference whatever to the constitutions which established the frame-

work of government in those States, but was aimed only at wrongs

or abuses existing or supposed to exist, or to be possible, under those

constitutions. . Yet it was not claimed on any side that for such

wrongs and abuses the guarantee of the Constitution had made pro-

vision; and to suggest that guarantee as the justiﬁcation for Federal

interference was to suggest the right, if not the duty, of.the Federal

Government to interfere in every case in which the administration of

State governments did not accord with the view prevailing in Con-

gress as to the method of administration, or the results to be expected

from the governments which, under the protection of the Federal

Constitution, had been established in the several States.

The Supreme Court of the United States, when considering in

Milligan's case.the validity of military commissbns for the trial of

offences against the government in the loyal States, repudiated the

doctrine which sometimes had been advanced, that when war prevailed

the Constitution must be silent; and declared that the guarantees of

liberty by that instrument were established for all times and all cir-

cumstances. The declaration was of a wholesome truth ; but if either
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of the judges who concurred in it, or any other person shall ever ex-

pect the same careful observance of the constitutioh and laws, either

by the people or by the constituted authorities, amid the excitements

and passions begotten of war, as is usually witnessed in time of peace,

he will ﬁnd little to justify the expectation in the experience of this

or any other country. In adjusting the relations of the rebel States to

the General Government, and in conforming their constitutions and laws

to the condition of affairs which accompanied and followed the destruc-

tion of slavery, many things were done which all must now concede

it was impossible to justify upon the letter of the Constitution, and

which their authors and supporters must defend on the ground that

from the extraordinary circumstances such an imperious necessity had

sprung as the framers of the Constitution could not possibly antici-

pate, and therefore, could not provide for. How far this defense

should in any particular instance be accepted as conclusive and satis-

factory, is a question not necessarily involved in the present discus-

sion. What now concerns us is that these extraordinary cases of

congressional intervention shall stand exceptional, and not bejustiﬁed

on the guarantee of the Constitution, and accepted as the guides and
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precedents for future action. To accept them as such would be to

put an end to the constitutional union made known to us in the

writings of the “ Federalist," and expounded in the decisions of

Marshall, Story, Taney, and Chase. It would be to brush away all

limitations to the powers of Congress in its dealings with the States,

and to leave that body at liberty to do what in the good pleasure of

its majority it shall please. With slavery destroyed we should be

at liberty to believe that the exceptional circumstances can never

again arise; and that consequently no one will ever again feel im-

pelled to justify Federal interference in the State affairs, on pretense

of a duty to guarantee a republican form of government, when the

form of government which had been. originally established in the

State with the approval of Congress, is still retained and adminis-

tered. Whatever discontented parties may do or say when the’

workings of State government displease them, there is a manifest

and imperative duty before every statesman and every lawyer, to

resist and if possib'le to defeat whatever shall have a tendency to

make the shifts and devices of a revolutionary period the precedents

for similar action after that period has passed away. If action, which

at the time was deemed wholly exceptional, and was only defended

on the exceptional circumstances, can be received as evidence of

settled law in the government, and if the people shall be found pre-
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pared to accept it as such, then indeed has a revolution of public

opinion taken place which sooner or later must work an entire and

radical revolution in the Government itself.

The cases which have occurred since reconstruction was treated

by the Federal Government as complete, though in every instance

having more or less connection with the reconstruction measures, and

springing more or less directly from conditions which were the legit-

imate consequences of the war, must nevertheless be brought to the

test of strict law. When once the‘ war was entirely at an end, the

excuse of its overruling necessity was no longer admissible, and the

need of securities for peace could no longer be urged after all which

were demanded had been given and accepted as sufﬁcient. If since

that time the domain of State government has been invaded by

Federal authority without the warrant of the Constitution, no hesita-

tion should be exhibited in any quarter in visiting the act with such

unequivocal condemnation as shall afford no encouragement to the

like ventures in the future.- It is not a light thing for that supreme

central authority which was created by the States with certain limited

and deﬁned powers, in order to promote union and insure domestic
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tranquillity, to turn upon the States with the power thus conferred,

and employ it for their humiliation or degradation, with the inevitable

result of weakening the union and promoting discord. The boun-

daries of authority were ﬁxed by solemn covenant, and deliberately to

break this in the smallest particular, would be deliberately to break

the bonds of union, to sow the seeds of distrust, and to furnish the

excuse for future violation-s, which in the end would make the‘ cove-

nant itself not a friendly partition of powers, but a hostile frontier

across which contending parties would charge and be driven accord--

ing as one or the other should from time to time prove strong enough

to take the aggressive.

The case of Louisiana in 1872-3, no attempt has been made of

late to justify on the principles of the Constitution; and without

entering into a discussion of its facts, we leave it as it was presented

in the Senate report of February 20, 1873, where it stands as a case

of- undeniable usurpation. The conclusions of fact in that report

were concurred in by some of the ablest lawyers of the nation, repre-

senting all political parties, and they were supported and illustrated

by the speeches of Mr. Carpenter and others, delivered in the Senate

in 1874. \Vith these speeches may usefully be read and considered

that of a person who was prominent in the whole affair—an adven-

turer made politician by the times—who for awhile under military
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protection, but without a shadow of right, acted as governor; who

had the surprising assurance to claim an election to both Houses of

the same Congress, and to contest a seat in each, and who, as the

agent of the Associated Press in his official report informs us, treated

the house to a “ humorous” speech in describing the mockery of

right, justice, and law, which, as he declared,had been substituted

for an election in that unhappy State. There can be nothing to com-

pare with such “ humor," but the “ amusement" with which the friends

and supporters of the governor in one of the reconstructed States are

said to have received the announcement that he had been indicted

for'the larceny of public moneys!

The chief actors in the tragedy of Louisiana were a few adventu-

rers, a few inferior Federal officers, and an inferior Federal judge.

The general voice, not only of the country as a whole, but of each

party in the country, has condemned the action, and therefore, though

the wrong done has never been redressed, it may at this time be

passed over without comment. A reasonable conclusion will be that

that which stands reproved in all official reports, will not be relied

upon as a justiﬁcation by any one who hereafter may be tempted to
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repeat it. It took place in a State one half of whose citizens were

still ignorant and unaccustomed to the enjoyment of political privi-

leges, and might easily be made either the victims or the instruments

- ofconspiracy or wrong. And it was so soon after the great war in which

de faclo governments had been overturned by military authority and

others dictated in their stead, and so many of the prejudices and

suspicions which the circumstances had begotten were still active and

violent, that we can not wonder the complaints of arbitrary and unlaw-

ful interference did not attract the notice and receive the prompt

attention they deserved, or ﬁnd the remedy that was adequate and

appropriate.*

We come now to the case of Arkansas, in which again the Presi-

dent was called upon to suppress domestic violence under circum-

stances requiring a decision between adverse claimants to the execu-

tive oﬁice. But here the case differed from that of Rhode Island,

in that there was no attempt to set aside an established constitution

and no purpose expressed to disregard the laws; but each claimant

acknowledging the same constitution, and professing obedience to

the same laws, only attempted to make good the assertion that he

had been chosen governor under them. The contest was conse-

quently one as to an election, and in its inception should have in-

volved only the question, Which candidate had received the greater
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number of lawful votes?

' The situation when the President’s interference was demanded

was this: Baxter and Brooks had been rival candidates before the

people, and the former had been declared duly elected, and had

taken upon himself the ofﬁce. Brooks asserted that the result was

accomplished by various frauds, and by wrongful rejection of votes,

and he contested it before the legislature; where the decision was

against him. On a case arising in the Supreme Court which presented

the point, that court decided it had no jurisdiction to interfere. In

" A majority of the house committee of the judiciary of the present Congress reported in

favor of the impeachment of the Federal judge, who was the chief ﬁgure in this usurpation,

but the report has not been acted upon. One learned member of that committee, himself a

jurist of honorable reputation, dissented from the condemnation of this judge, and certi-

ﬁed to his character as a “Christian gentleman," which he seemed to think should be

an ample shield against accusations of criminal conduct. It is always gratifying when the

upright oﬂicer is found to unite with other qualities a gentlemanly deportment and a

Christian humility, but to excuse great public offences behind deportment and profession

is, to say the least, unfortunate. For while such considerations are entirely foreign to

any investigation of official conduct, it is not to be denied that bringing them forward where

they have no place, and in such a connection, must have an inevitable tendency to subject

them to public contempt and derision.
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this the court was unquestionably right. A disputed election to the

oﬂice of governor may of necessity present questions for judicial

determination when no other tribunal has been designated for the

decision of the contest, but there are many reasons why the more

suitable authority for its settlement is the legislature of the State,

which can act promptly and without regard to forms, while a judicial

contest might continue for months, possibly even for t_he whole term

of oﬂice, and be embarrassed more or less with questions of plead-

ing and technical law, to the incalculable prejudice of public inter-

ests and the public order. And by the constitution of Arkansas,

the legislature had wisely been vested with complete and ﬁnal

authority in the premises.*

Brooks nevertheless insisting that a majority of the electors had

cast their suffrages for him, began suit in one of the circuit courts, but,

on a demurrer being interposed, allowed the case to sleep. It would

be wandering from the present discussion to enter upon the inquiry

whether the assertion of Brooks that he was cheated out of his

election, had any foundation in fact. If he was, a great outrage was

perpetrated upon his rights, and a greater upon the people of the

State. No offence against property, and no wrongto individual

persons, can compare in enormity with such a robbery of political

rights. But this could have no bearing upon the case, as it was
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afterwards submitted to the President. Contested elections, like all

other controversies, must be submitted to the determination of some

competent tribunal, and, satisfactory or not, right or wrong, the deci-

sion must be sustained, or there can be no end to controversy and no

settled government. It is far more important to the people that the

executive power should be unquestionable, than that any particular

person should wield it. Brooks was not the ﬁrst person wrongfully

* The section of the Constitution is as follows: “ The returns of every election for gov-

ernor, lieutenant-governor, secretary of state, treasurer, auditor, attorney-general, and super-

intendent of public instruction shall be sealed up and transmitted to the seat of government,

by the returning oﬁicers, and directed to the presiding oliicer of the Senate, who, during

the ﬁrst week of the session, shall open and publish the same in presence of the members

there assembled. The person having the highest number of votes shall be declared elected;

but if two or more shall have the highest and an equal number of votes for the same oﬂice,

one of them shall be chosen by a joint vote of both houses. Contested elections shall like-

wise be determined by both houses of the general assembly, as is, or may hereafter be p;€-

scribed by law.” To our mind there can be no plausible suggestion that the decision of

the general assembly on such a contest is open to judicial review afterwards, but it may not

be inappropriate to refer to Grier 1/emu: Shackelford, S. C. Const. Rep., 642 ; Batman 1/errur

Mcgowan, I Metcalfe's Ky. Rep., 533 ; State verrur Harlow, 15 Ohio State Rep., 134 ; People

versus Goodwin, 22 Mich. Rep., 496, which are in point.
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counted out in a contest for the office of governor. To pass over

cases in regard to which there may be ‘question, we may refer to that

of Chief-justice jay, who met the same fate in his candidature against

Clinton, and though his incensed and excited -followers appealed to

him to resist, he chose the wiser and more patriotic course, and bowed

in submission to the unjust determination of the canvassers. The

result proved that the State did not suffer from this wrong, the cause

of order suffered only temporarily, no one suffered in public respect

and reputation but the canvassers and their supporters, and the great

jurist, by his implicit obedience to the law .under circumstances of

such aggravation and injustice, was elevated to higher position in

the public regard. Had that eminent example been followed in

Arkansas, the country would have been spared some excitement and

the people of that State some expenditure of money and military

display. That it was not followed is due to one of those sudden

mutations in State politics which, as they have occurred in the recon-

structed States, have so mystiﬁed the people of the country, until

the personal interests which lay back of them were brought to light

and explained. If Brooks was cheated out of his election, it was

through a combination which embraced the leading politicians of the

State, and placed some of them in Congress. So long as the parties

hung together there was peaceful acquiescence in the legislative deci-
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sion. But the time arrived when, for reasons of their own, the others

were found disposed to rid themselves of the governor, and for that

purpose ready to make use of measures as objéctionable to get him

out as those by means of which he had been put in. It was under

such circumstances that the sleeping suit appears to have -taken on

new vitality, the extraordinary decision of the Circuit Court that

Baxter be ousted as a usurper and Brooks installed in his place was

made, and then the State House and public records were seized, and

then came the call to arms. -

If in the light of the facts stated, the duty of the President to

support Baxter can be less clear than was the duty of Mr. Tyler to

support the charter government in the Rhode Island case, the grounds

of doubt are certainly not very manifest. The tribunal which the

State constitution had given complete authority in the premises,

had decided the election, and the President could not go behind the

record, and was not at liberty to question the conclusion. Baxter

was governor defarta, and by the adjudication of the legishture he

was also governor dejure. The President had nothing to do but to

recognize the existing status, and respond to his demand for assist-
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ance. He was no more at liberty to inquire into the facts of the

election with a view to bring his' own judgment to bear upon its

legality and fairness, than Mr. Tyler was at liberty to inquire into

the justice of the complaints made against the Rhode Island charter.

The President was not the tribunal to which complaints of hardship

or injustice could be made in the one case any more than in the

other. Some attempt was made to confuse the controversy, by bring-

ing out a remarkable expression of opinion by a majority of the judges

of the State Supreme Court in support of the judgment entered up

at the Circuit; but this paper calls for little remark. It was the

mere dictum of the judges in a collusive case, and it referred to a

subject which plainly by the Constitution, as they had previously

held, was taken from their jurisdiction. The President -was mani-

festly right in disregarding this document, as he would also have been

in disregarding the so-called judicial action which was had in the

Louisiana case.

And here it would be agreeable to leave this controversy, where

it was left by the wise and just determination of the President, if

the parties concerned had permitted that determination to conclude

it. But as action was afterwards taken in Congress on the subject,

and the future possibilities of the case are of the highest importance,

it may be well to consider it a little further. And this may render it
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necessary to give some attention to the boundaries of executive and

legislativeauthority, since these departments of the government may

possibly in any such 'case be found to differ in their views regarding

the course to be pursued, and to diverge in their action.

Of course the necessity in the President to decide between two

claimants implies a possibility that he may decide in favor of either.

It was legally possible, therefore, that in this case he would decline

the request he acceded to, and respond to one from the opposing

claimant. Had he done so, the temporary result at least would have

been a revolution in State authority. The mere statement of the

possibility is sufﬁcient to suggest the immense power that may be

wielded by the Federal executive. Our holiday orators delight with

patriotic fervor to draw distinctions between our own and other

countries, and to declare that here the law is master and the highest

officer is but the servant of the law, while even in free England the

monarch is irresponsible and enjoys the most complete personal im-

munity.’ But such comparisons are misleading, and may prove mis-

chievous. In how many directions is not the executive authority in

America practically superior to what it is in England ? And can we say
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that the President is really in any substantial sense any more the

servant of the law than is the Queen? Perhaps, if we were candid,

we should confess that the danger that the executive may be tempted

to a disregard of the law may justly be believed ‘greater in America

than in countries where the chief magistrate comes to his ofﬁce with-

out the selection of the people, and where consequently their vigi-

lance is quickeried by a natural distrust. Edward Livingston,

through bitter experience in his own person, had occasion to observe

this, and in his protest against the arbitrary and high-handed action

of the President to de'clare that,

- “ The gloss of zeal for the public service is always spread over acts of oppression,

and the people are sometimes made to consider that as a brilliant exertion of energy

in their favor, which when viewed in its true light, would be found a fatal blow to

their rights. In no government is this effect so easily produced as in a free repub-

lic ; party spirit, inseparable from its existence, aids the illusion, and a popular

leader is allowed in many instances impunity, and sometimes rewarded with ap-

plause, for acts which would make a tyrant tremble on his throne."

We trust because we have chosen; “ we wink in slothful over-

trust; " and yet the man of our choice may possibly come to deserve

the invective of Mr. Livingston, “the magistrate of a free people play-

ing the Tartuffe of liberty—adoring it in theory, but in practice vio-

lating its most sacred principles." * Perhaps it would be safer always
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to assume, as some writers have insisted was only reasonable, that in

power all men are depraved, wicked, and corrupt, and that protection

against the oppression of rulers can be found-, not in their character

or sense of justice, but only in mutual checks, restraints, and oppo-

sition of powers.f \/Ve establish the mutual checks and restraints,

but proceed then to cast the mantle of charity over the officers of our

choice, and to assume and persist in the assumption that, in their

action, whatever is is right.

The executive power in this country is certainly to be administered

under the laws, and the President is the servant of the law and not

above it. But to say this, is not equivalent to saying that the law

must be declared for him through the judgments of courts. We have

seen already that as regardspolitical questions the courts cannot

pronounce the law, but must take it as it is given by Congress and

the President. There may be other questions, which from‘ their very

nature can not come before the courts, but must appeal ex mcessitate

to the executive department for solution. Of this desca'ption was

* Hunt's Life of Livingston, ch. 8.

+ Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws, b. xi., c. 4; Chipman on Government, 44.
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one which during the war arose in Missouri. The Supreme Court was

set aside by constitutional ordinance, if the ordinance itself was valid,

and a new court established instead. The old court declared the ordi-

nance void, but the governor, holding otherwise, removed the judges

from the oﬁicial rooms by force, and caused the new appointees to

be inducted into oﬁice. For such a question only this or a similar

solution was possible, for the old incumbents could no more decide

it than the new, and for either set to assume the right to decide at

all, was to assume that they were the lawful judges, which was the

very point in controversy. Something analogous occurred in Texas

after its last election, and it is possible for the Federal executive to

encounter questions involving a similar necessity. . But in other cases,

though the nature of the question may not be such as to remove its con-

sideration from the judicial forum, if only executive duty is involved,

we know of no authority for bringing the President before the courts,

in order either that the duty may be performed under their ‘direction,

or that after its performance their judgment may be had concerning

its legality or propriety. The executive, like the judiciary, constitutes

anindependent department of the government, and his decision in

the line of his duty is as conclusive upon others as are the judgments

of courts. It may be wrong, and so may be theirs; it may be cor-

rupt, and unfortunately there may be corrupt judgments also: the
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remedy is the same in both cases. There can be no appeal from the

one to the other; but for dishonesty, falsejudgment, or oppression, there

may be punishment of either on impeachment. Even Mr. Vi/ebster,

who argued so strongly for the supremacy of the law as it had been

declared in adjudged cases, argued only the duty of the President to

accept the conclusions of the courts, and did not assume that he could

be compelled to do so. It is clear that the executive could not be

subjected to compulsory process in any case, without degrading the

executive authority to a position of inferiority and dependence.

Executive action, however, is almost always subject directly and

immediately to the control of Congress, except in so far as it is made

independent by the Constitution itself. No one can doubt its being

subject to the direction and supervision of Congress in cases like those

we have been considering, and if action has hitherto been left to the

discretion of the President in these cases, it was not because Congress

was without power in the premises, but because of the neglect of

Congress‘o act, which would imply its assent to what was being done.

Undoubtedly Congress is the proper authority to determine questions

of a political nature as they arise within the sphere of the Federal
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powers. If the President shall have occasion to take action ﬁrst, his

action can be little more than provisional; to stand unless set aside

by Congress ; and if he shall usurp authority, if he shall disregard the

law, if he shall violate constitutional right or decide corruptly, the

duty of Congress to give the appropriate and adequate redress will be

plain and imperative.

The indirect appeal which was taken to Congress from the action

of the President in the Arkansas case was complicated, as all such

cases are likely to be, by the political sympathies of members with

the parties more directly concerned. But the President’s position

was so clearly right that an open attack upon it was not be ventured

upon. He had found a State controversy closed by State adjudica-

tion, and he had refused to open it. He had responded to the demand

of the Constitution instead of listening to those 'who would invite

partisan action. But the resources of men who had taken lessons in

the reconstruction of a State like Arkansas were not likely to be

exhausted by any direct and open measure that might be resorted to

or proposed. It was not forgotten that since the close of the civil

war, vague general language concerning the guarantee of a republican

government had sometimes been employed with good effect, and that,

without any distinct speciﬁcation of the grounds of action, Congress

in some instances had been enabled to exercise most important powers
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in shaping State policy and government. It might be quite true that

the President's action, when clearly right in point of law, would carry

a weight rendering a direct assault upon it useless, but might not a

resolution of inquiry, whether the State maintains a republican form

of government, be employed effectively by indirection to accomplish

the same purpose?

A resolution of inquiry may seem a very harmless measure; just

as perhaps it seemed to Hastings when Gloster demanded

_ “What they deserve

That do conspire my death with devilish plots

Of damned withcraft ; " '

—just as it might have seemed to Luther journeying to Worms, had

he not known that the power that inquired, might also on its own

reasons condemn and execute. In times like the'present, when the

highest considerations of duty demand of every citizen that he should

be active and vigilant in bringing the nation back to an exagt observ-

ance of constitutional obligations and rights, if an exceptional meas-

ure be resorted to, it can never be unimportant to inquire why it is
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taken, what it means, to what it tends, and what it threatens. And

this_ is peculiarly important if we ﬁnd the measure receiving support

from only one party, and that an endeavor by the opposing party to

extend its scope, so as to embrace another case coming apparently

within the same reasons, is defeated. Such was the case here,—the

resolution of inquiry receiving no support from the opposition, who

vainly endeavored to secure an amendment which should include

South Carolina. The case, therefore, assumed something of the

appearance of a party contest in Congress over the rights of a State.

The sincerity and patriotism which led the majority in Congress

to the adoption of the resolution are not to be questioned. But back

of these was the pressure of local politicians who came forward after

a long-continued and most suspicious delay, to make charges which,

if true, should 1’equire some of them to vacate important public

positions and retire to the private life to which they were seeking to

force the acting governor. It would be reasonable to expect that

whoever should demand such an inquiry would bring forward against

the State the charge of a failure to maintain a republican form of

government, because, when the State authorities called for no

intervention, such a charge alone would justify action. But no such

expectation would be justiﬁed by the facts. No member ventured

to rise in his place in Congress, and assert that the republican consti-
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tion of Arkansas had been set aside, or that the government was not

being administered according to its forms. There were indeed accu-

sations that the governor had been elected by the assistance of fraud;

that some members of the legislature had been unjustly deprived of

their seats, and that disorder and violence were rife in the State.

The ﬁrst two charges were not only disposed of by State adjudica-

tion, but also by a peaceable acquiescence which rendered it in a high

degree unwise and impolitic to open the subject anew, even if it were

competent to do so. As to the third, there was no pretense that

the State authorities were now demanding aid in maintaining order.

The charges, then, if true, made out no case for Federal interference;

and they could not be assumed to be true, because two of them had

been heard and decided against, and the third under the Constitution

was only to be shown by a demand from the State authoritie_s,

which was not produced. Nevertheless a resolution was passed

which necessarily implied the existence of a _z>rz'ma facie case against

the Stat of a failure to maintain republican government; and to

inquire mto the truth of this, a committee of investigation was

ordered.
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The composition of the committee gives reasonable assurance of

a fair investigation with the purpose to reach correct results. But

such an investigation, with whatever purpose ordered or by whom-'

soever conducted, necessarily assumes a threatening attitude toward

the State. No inference that it is entered upon as a mere matter of

form is admissible, but it must be supposed that the House regarded

it as based upon grounds which were suﬁicient, if they should be

supported by the evidence. The inquiry, then, is whether the State

maintains such a form of government as the Federal constitution

recognizes, and the remedy, if the charges, actual or implied, are sus-

tained, can be nothing short of the substitution of some other gov-

ernment for that which in this State falsely assumes to be republican,

In other words, regarding the investigation as ordered in good faith

and for proper purposes, the exact case is this: A disturbed condi-

tion of affairs being found to exist in one of the States, one House

of Congress raises a committee to inquire and report to that body

whether the State government should not be set aside, and some

other—-which necessarily would be of Congressional invention or sug-

gestion—provided in its stead. If the investigation contemplates

possible action, if it has in view any other purpose than merely the

gratification of public curiosity by an exposure to the public of the local

politics of a State, it can not mean and can not threaten less than this.
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It thus has an inevitable tendency to suggest that the precedents of

reconstruction may properly be perpetuated, and that the States may

be made to hold their political rights on the tenure of a behavior

that is satisfactory to the Federal authorities. For ourselves, the

concession must be made that in the condition of Arkansas little has

been discovered for some years that is particularly gratifying, but

the denial is emphatic, that a republican form of government implies

that the State is always to be free from disorders, or that decisions

upon contested elections shall always be just, or that the State admin-

istrations shall always be in harmony with those elected by the

people-—or by themselves—to Congress, and subject to be set aside

when those persons withdraw their support. And for a State gov-

emment to be tried for its existence upon vague general charges

constituting’ no triable oﬁ"ence, before a body which, however pure,

honorable, and patriotic it may be, will yet measure for itself its

own powers, and be but‘ too prone to judge all political questions

from the stand-point of party interest, is no more a light thing than

it would be for a civilian to be put on trial before a court-martial on

charges of which such a court could have no jurisdiction, but under
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circumstances which should render its decision upon its authority a

ﬁnality. What matters it that the Constitution forbids, if Congress

wills it and no other authority can interfere? There is an old

proverb that for sovereign power all laws are broken ; and this may

prove as true of a Congress as of a Caesar.

Of the propriety of a like inquiry as demanded by the opposition

in the case of South Carolina, we must judge from the complaints

which are publicly made of the Condition of affairs in that State.

The current complaints are that ignorant freedmen constitute the

controlling majority of electors; that they choose worthless adven-

turers, ignorant ﬁeld-hands, and dishonest schemers to public oﬁices;

that the governor is notoriously dishonest and criminal, and that the

public are systematically plundered by him and by other officers to

whom he gives immunity by his prerogative of pardon. These

charges are of the same general nature with those but recently made

against the government of New York, and do not go a step beyond

them, except in implicating the chief executive in the prevailing cor-

ruption. Even in that particular the difference is not great, for the

governor of New York was persistently charged with being inﬂuenced

in his ofﬁcial action by a dishonest combination which controlled the

city, and through the city controlled the State. If, therefore, these

charges justify setting aside a State government in South Carolina,
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then the government of New York should have been set aside by

Congress without waiting the action of societies of political reform.

But in that case, as in this, the real complaint was not that the State

failed to maintain a republican form of government, but it was that

the basis of suffrage had been made so broad, that classes unﬁt to.

govern were enabled to rule. The complaint was not of too little

republicanism, but of too much. The evil had been brought upon

South Carolina by the deliberate action of the people of the Union

in amending the Constitution, and it could only be cured by retracing _

the step, or by the gradual education of the people in their duties and

-obligations as citizens. The former no one proposes; the latter is a

-work of time, and may leave the people of that unhappy State for a

period exposed to the rapacity of adventurers, but in the end is

expected to vindicate the theory of our institutions. One thing is

clear; to concede to the Federal government authority to take to

itself State powers, on an assumption that -the people of a State have

_shown themselves incapable of self-government, and must conse-

quently be ruled by the strong hand of the central power, would be

to concede the failure of the American experiment in government.
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A. Congressional investigation, it must be repeated, can never be

harmless when it is ordered on grounds or under circumstances which

have an inevitable tendency to strengthen, encourage, and perpetuate

the unconstitutional notion that Congress may rightfully intermeddle

with and overhaul State affairs and State governments whenever any

‘thing in their administration shall be displcasing to the majority in

that body. Such proceedings are necessarily in the direction of sub-

stituting for the republicanism, agreed upon in forming the Constitu-

tion, a different republicanism whose manifestations as we witness them

in the neighboring republic of Mexico are not assuring to those who

_ have faith in government by the people. It is not always certain that

investigations will be in the hands ofjurists, skilled in legal forms and

principles and disposed to act under the guidance of settled rules,

but they are as likely to be instigated in times of high party excite-

ment, under the leadership of men—of whom unfortunately we still

have some—whose political training has been such as to lead them

to look upon the ballot-box as an instrument of no more sanctity

than any other with which a game may be played for the proﬁt of the

player. They may come at a time of presidential election, and be the

pretense by the aid of which the result may be controlled. They

may assail one State because she does not better enforce her prohib-

itory legislation, and another because she disgraces republicanism by
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not paying her debts, and a third, perhaps, when a majority of the

proper stamp shall appear inCongress, because she sends her “ states-

men " to a convict island, instead of making them governors and sen-

ators. In short, any thing may be suggested as possible when the

whole subject is thrown open to a Congressional discretion, prover-

bially prone to be carried away by the passions and excitements of

the hour.

The case of Rhode Island ought to be regarded as settling for all

time the two points involved in it: I, That the President and Con-

gress must continue to recognize and support the constitution once

established in a State, and regularly accepted as republican, against

any revolutionary measures that may be instituted for its overthrow;

and 2, That their action in the premises is not subject to judicial

review. The ﬁrstpoint was determined by the action of the Presi-

dent, under the advice of Mr. Webster, acquiesced in by Congress

and the people under circumstances implying a clear approval. The

second was settled by the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court,

approved on several occasions after its membership had almost wholly

changed. The case of Arkansas should settle in like manner, by the
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acceptance of the President's conclusion, the doctrine that as between

two persons claiming the State executive authority, if the proper and

competent State tribunal has rendered decision, such decision must

be accepted and followed. Any' other‘ doctrine must strike at the

foundation of State government, and leave Congress and the President

supreme. '

There is yet one other case which might stand apart from these,

and in which no action within the State could constitute authority

or furnish guidance for that of the Federal Government. There might

be such a forcible or fraudulent usurpation of all departments of a

State government as would render a competent decision on questions

of contested election impossible. Obviously the decision of a usurp-

ing legislature that a usurper was lawfully ‘chosen governor, could

bind no one. But to suppose such a case with suﬁicient following to

make it successful, would be nearly equivalent to supposing the people

unﬁt for self-government. Something similar was once tried in Wis-

consin, where a governor declared himself re-elected, and denied the

'right of any other authority to question the declaration ; but though

he was head of a party embracing half the voters of the State, and

which would lose power by his defeat, the attempt. was a miserable

failure. The worst there is reason to look for is such a setting aside

of the will of the people under technical quibbles as was accomplished
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in the case of jay; and in such cases the people will bow to the

decision of the law, even though they believe it to be bad law. A

Case of pure usurpation, unless the people are kept down by military

force, can scarcely fail in some form to encounter prompt and effec-

tive opposition sufﬁcient to render its success impossible. In the

absence of military force, or of outside support to the alleged usurpa-

tion, it should generally be conclusive against the allegation that the

authority set up has been quietly submitted to until the ordinary

business of legislation has been transacted, laws made, put in opera-

tion and acted upon by the people as part of the law of the land.

The law of limitation which public policy would establish for com-

plaints of that nature, must be short and conclusive, or the civil state

may be kept in a condition of chronic disturbance and unrest from

the uncertainty of its legal foundations. It should be observed also

as regards such a complaint that.an unjust deprivation of one or more

members of their seats in a legislative body does not make out a

_usurpation of legislative authority; if it did, it is feared that a case

._might be made against Congress as conclusive as has ever been set up

against a State ; for all parties have been quite too prone to dispose
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of contested seats on partisan grounds. A legislative body being the

ﬁnaljudge of the election and qualiﬁcations of its members, any num-

ber of decisions believed to be unjust or erroneous, can furnish no

excuse for interference : it is only when a body of men not constitu-

ting a legislature in fact, assumes to be such, and performs the mockery

of admitting and rejecting claimants to seats, that its decisions can

be treated as nullities. When such a case shall occur, it will -be

pertinent to inquire where are the true members, that they fail to

meet and effect a legal organization? If, without compulsion or the

terror of military force or threats, they abstain from doing so until the

usurpers possess themselves of the authority of the State and exercise

it with general consent, the rule of repose already referred to may

justly be applied against them to bar their complaints; while if they

were restrained by violence, or overcome by force or threats, their

appeal for external assistance should be as prompt as the circum-

stances may admit, lest public acquiescence may introduce unnecessary

diiﬁculties. We therefore say that, while it is possible there may be

such a usurpation of the whole State government, or at least of the

political departments thereof, as may render the intervention of the

Federal government imperative, yet after any considerable delay not

compelled by force the presumptions should be conclusive against it ;

and the thing is in itself so improbable, and its success, unless the
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people are held in subjection by military force, so extremely unlikely,

that a very clear prima facie case should be presented to Congress

before its intervention should be secured. To invite Congress with-

out sufﬁcient cause into the ﬁeld of State politics must generally but

add to party feelings and prejudices, and thus intensify instead of

solving the local diﬂiculties. Partisans are not likely to come, as Mr.

Madison's sanguine mind anticipated they would in such cases, pre-

pared to act between the rival claimants with the impartiality of

judges and the affection of friends. They are more likely to come

with feelings suﬁiciently wrought up to tempt them to make the

rights of the State itself a mere foot-ball in party politics. When

there are no effective checks and balances, usurpation with wonderful

ease

“ broadens slowly down

From precedent to precedent." ‘

Against the encroachments of Federal authority upon the States,

the effective checks, if any, must be found in the wisdom and patriot-

ism of rulers. The States, when wronged, must appeal for justice to

the power that wrongs them. They must, if possible, awaken to vig-
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orous activity the constitutional scruples of members of Congress. If

every member of that body were a statesman, accustomed to look

beyond the politics of the day in determining his action, the danger

of overriding the just local powers would be less imminent; but it is

unfortunately the case that too many concern themselves only with

the probabilities of political storms in the immediate future, and that

to avoid harm from these is the political wisdom of many party lead-

ers. The statesman can not bound his horizon by the necessities or

policy of his party, and can not handle questions of state from regard

alone to party interest or party advancement. Parties are useful as

they constitute checks upon each other, and tend to keep the people

vigilant in watching for abuses under thelaws, and for encroachments

upon the Constitution; but when encroachments are once admitted

_ which may appear to tend to the advantage of any party in power, it

is possible for all to tolerate and in turn to practice them. Invasions

of State authority for national or local party purposes are precisely

of this nature.

Deprecating, as every good citizen must, all Federal interference in

State affairs except in strict conformity with the Constitution, it seems

proper to remark that a habit of look'ing to Washington for almost

every thing has been growing of late among State ofﬁcials, and that

instances might be given of calls by States upon the President for
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troops to put down local riots and disorders so insigniﬁcant in them-

selves that any sheriif of an average share of courage and vigor would

have found ample resources for their suppression in the ordinary civil

posse. A governor who makes such a call without necessity confesses

his own inadequacy to his position. It should also be said that

while the existing administration has subjected itself to severe criti-

cism for certain cases of interference, it has an undisputed claim to

commendation in other cases of refusal. We refer particularly to the

case of Texas, in which military aid was called for to enable a defeated

administration to hold on to office, and to that of Mississippi in which

troops were demanded on pretense of “ preserving order" at an elec-

tion. The President refused in the latter case, on the technical

ground that the demand was not in strict conformity with the Consti-

tution, but no secret was made of the fact that back of this was the

reason that the demand was wholly unnecessary, and that the troops,

if sent, could have no mission unless to overawe electors. The result

demonstrated the President’s wisdom, for_a more orderly election has

never occurred. The Texas case was peculiarly one in which no

decision within the State could aid the President. An election had
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been held, which, if valid, was to make an entire change in the State

government, the judiciary included. The defeated candidates set up

a constitutional objection, which the Supreme Court on being appealed

to sustained. But that was the court that would go out. The court

that would come in as a result of the election would doubtless hold

otherwise, and the one was as competent to decide a question upon

which its own existence depended as the other. When under such

circumstances the defeated governor called upon the President for

assistance in retaining his ofﬁce, the President very properly declined

to interpose, or to consider in any way the constitutional question

involved. The party appealing for aid had contested the election

before the people and been defeated, and he might well be refused

extraordinary remedies when the appeal itself was a stultiﬁcation of
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his own action.

